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Abstract— In a wireless sensor network (WSN), when an
adversary physically captures one or more sensor nodes, all the
information stored on these nodes may be exposed completely.
Consequently, the adversary can use the information to attack
the remaining part of the network. In this paper, we investigate
the effects of different node capture attack patterns on state-of-
the-art key management schemes. We find that a compromised
WSN can be made resilient to such attacks by introducing new
resources, such as new nodes and new keys. Based on this
observation, we propose two recovering strategies, namely, link
replacement strategy and node replenishment strategy, to replace
the compromised links and the functions of the compromised
region, respectively. Simulation results indicate that our proposed
strategies can improve the network resilience of a compromised
WSN significantly with a small amount of additional resources.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks, node capturing attacks,
leaked keys, broken communication links, recovery, node replace-
ment, link replacement.
I. INTRODUCTION
A typical wireless sensor network (WSN) is usually com-
posed of a large number of small battery-powered devices
operated in an autonomous manner [1]. Such devices (also
called nodes hereafter) are equipped with relatively limited
computational power and wireless networking hardware with
a limited transmission range. Capable of working collabora-
tively, devices in a WSN can achieve many useful functions
in a hostile environment, where putting human personnel
would lead to grave danger [1]. For instance, in a modern
combat situation, a WSN would be useful for various military
functions such as remote surveillance, intelligence gathering
in a hostile terrain, team assault operations, etc. Indeed, the
US Army has an intense recent interests in deploying armored
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) such as the SWORDS
robots [7] for carrying out anti-insurgent operations.
Since a WSN is expected to handle important information
in a hostile situation, security is of a prime concern. Specifi-
cally, every packet transmitted has to be encrypted and every
sensor node has to be authenticated. To support encryption
and authentication, an efficient and effective key management
scheme is a necessity. Currently, there are a number of key
management scheme proposed in WSNs [13].
With the support of an efficient and effective key manage-
ment scheme, the network itself and the information transmit-
ted can be protected from any external attacker. Unfortunately,
recent research has shown that it is highly probable for a sensor
node to be captured physically [12]. By physically capturing
a sensor node, under a worst case assumption, an attacker can
presumably get all the keys and the encryption information
contained in the node.
In this paper, we evaluate two commonly adopted key man-
agement schemes under two attack patterns. Our observation
of the performance of these two key management schemes
under two different attack models motivates us to design a
novel link replacement strategy which performs key update on
the links no matter they are compromised or not. In particular,
in closest neighbor attack model which is a more realistic
attack model intuitively, we observe that captured nodes are
generally clustered. By bounding the regions of a node capture
attack, we propose to carry out node replenishment in the
severely attacked region to restore the secure connectivity of
the regions to other parts of the network. By doing so, the
network lifetime can be extended even with the presence of
compromised nodes.
The organization of this paper is as follow. In Section II, we
briefly describe the related work. In Section III, we describe
two node capture attack patterns and evaluate their effects
to two common adopted key management schemes in terms
of network resilience. Afterwards, we propose two recovery
strategies—Link Replacement Strategy and Node Replenish-
ment Strategy in Section IV. Then, we evaluate and demon-
strate the feasibility of these two strategies through extensive
simulations in Section V. Finally, we conclude our work with
some possible future research directions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, De et al. [8] proposed a model of virus and
worm spreading in WSNs. Their works were motivated by the
recent spread of a kind of virus known as cabir [5] through
wireless medium (e.g., Bluetooth) in mobile network. They
extended this idea to the node compromising attack in WSNs.
They investigated this attack with the use of epidemic theory
and tried to develop a defensive strategy specifically targeted
for the spreading of virus or worms. Unlike their work, we
consider the node capture attack due to physically capturing a
node by an attacker. This attack is shown to be highly feasible
[12].
To prevent physical node capture attack, the most effective
technique is to armor each sensor node with tamper-resistance
hardware [3], [18]. However, this technique is generally con-
sidered as impracticable due to the high cost and large size
of the tamper-resistance hardware. In view of this, Alarifi
and Du [2] proposed to use code diversifying technique.
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They proposed to use different memory locations to store
sensitive information for different nodes. By doing so, even
if an attacker cracks a sensor node by using the node capture
attack suggested in [12] and figures out the location of the
sensitive information in the memory of that particular node,
such memory location information cannot be used to obtain
the sensitive information of other nodes in the network. This
technique can greatly lengthen the time an attacker needed
to compromise a node. Unfortunately, an attacker can still
compromise the whole network if he/she is given enough time.
On the other hand, Song et al. [17] admitted the seriousness
of the node capture attack to WSNs. They pointed out the
importance of locating the compromise node in the network.
They suggested that most of the current techniques only takes
a reactive approach, i.e., to detect the misbehavior caused by
the compromised nodes. The rationale is that we do not know
which nodes are actually compromised unless the compro-
mised nodes misbehave. By contrast, Song et al. proposed a
proactive approach to detect node capture. According to their
approach, each node tries to measure the differences between
the location information of its neighbor node (and also the
neighbor list information) before and after they disappear and
then reappear. By doing so, a node can actively estimate
whether its neighbor node has been compromised.
Currently, most of the proposed work suggested that a
compromised node has to be isolated from other network com-
ponents after they are detected. However, Strasser and Vogt
[19] suggested that the isolation approach leads to a wastage
of resources because a compromised node can still function
normally after it is recovered. They discussed some guidelines
for node recovery and proposed a method to reprogram the
compromised nodes. As a result, the recovered nodes can
be restarted in the “clean” state. However, in [19], they also
admitted that this recovery mechanism is quite complicated.
Yang and Cardei [20] and Chatzigiannakis et al. [6] pro-
posed the concept of node redeployment. The main thrust
of their approaches is to redeploy the nodes in the network
to extend the lifetime, enhance delivery ratio, etc. This idea
is similar to our node replenishment idea proposed in this
paper. However, our work focuses on the feasibility and the
effectiveness of node replenishment to replace the functions of
the compromised nodes and repair some of the compromised
links by link replacement strategy whenever possible.
III. COMPROMISING A WSN
Currently, most existing key management schemes [4], [9],
[11], [13], [14], [16] assume a random attack pattern in the
sensor network security analysis. However, this may not be
realistic in practice. Specifically, sensor nodes are supposed to
be largely distributed over a large geographical area. In this
section, two commonly adopted key management schemes are
first evaluated. Then, we investigate the differences between
the random attack and the closest neighbor attack patterns in
terms of network resilience.
A. Key Pre-distribution Schemes
Key pre-distribution schemes refer to key management
schemes in which keys are randomly generated and distributed
to the sensor nodes before they are deployed. Two commonly
adopted key management schemes are the schemes proposed
by Eschenauer et al. [11] (we refer to this scheme as basic
scheme in this paper) and Du et al. [9] (we refer to this scheme
as deployment knowledge scheme in this paper), respectively.
1) Basic Scheme: Based on random graph theory [10],
Eschenauer et al. assumed that a random graph is formed in
the sensor network. They proposed to install a random set of
keys drawn from a very large key pool into each sensor node.
A set of keys is also known as a key ring. Any two neighbors in
the network are assumed to be securely connected if they have
a key in common in both key rings. Eschenauer et al. showed
mathematically that a certain connectivity and an acceptable
level of network resilience can be obtained by maintaining a
certain ratio of key ring size and key pool size.
2) Deployment Knowledge Scheme: Intuitively, the larger
the ratio of key ring size and key pool size, the higher will be
the connectivity. However, this will also reduce the level of
network resilience. In view of this, Du et al. [9] exploited the
deployment knowledge of the sensor nodes to reduce the ratio
needed to maintain the desired connectivity. By knowing the
approximate deployment location of each sensor, the whole
key pool can be divided into several smaller sub key pools.
Each sub key pool is then assigned to a region. Nodes in
nearby region can then generate a smaller key ring by drawing
the keys randomly from similar sub key pools.
B. Attack Patterns
Only two attack patterns are considered in this paper due to
their large discrepancy in performances which motivates our
work in this paper. The reader is referred to [15] for more
details. The two attack patterns considered are:
Random attack pattern: This is the most widely used
attack pattern in WSN research. Nodes are randomly picked
by an attacker to compromise. This pattern can illustrate the
network resilience when the keys are randomly pre-distributed
in the nodes prior to deployment. However, this attack pattern
may not be realistic as it may not be possible for an attacker
to randomly pick sensors to compromise.
Closest neighbor attack pattern: When an attacker finishes
compromising a sensor node, he/she may try to find another
sensor node which is the closest to the current compromised
node. This attack pattern is realistic and occurs frequently in
a practical scenario.
To evaluate the resilience of our framework against node
capture attack, we measure the fraction of communication
links compromised when x nodes are captured. This method of
measuring network resilience is generally adopted [11], [9],
[14]. Figure 1(a) shows the network resilience of the basic
scheme under the above attack patterns, while Figure 1(b)
shows that of the deployment knowledge scheme. The results
of these two figures are obtained using the simulation settings
discussed in Section 4.4 of [15] (similar settings are also used
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in the simulations discussed in Section V in this paper). In
Figure 1(a), we can see that the basic scheme achieves similar
performance under two different attack models. This is mainly
due to the fact that keys are evenly distributed among all the
nodes in the network.
In Figure 1(b), the deployment knowledge scheme exhibits
a very good network resilience against the closest neighbor
attack by dividing the key pool in sub-key pools so that
different regions have different sub-key pools. This limits the
effect of attack within the attack region.
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of Network resilience of various scheme under different
attack patterns at p = 0.33.
IV. RECOVERY STRATEGIES
In this section, we first briefly discuss the motivations and
assumptions of our recovery strategies. Then, we describe
these two proposed strategies – Link Replacement Strategy and
Node Replenishment Strategy in detail.
A. Motivation
The results shown in Section III are very interesting in three
different aspects. Firstly, the use of different attack patterns
does have different effects to the network resilience based on
the key management schemes adopted. Secondly, the use of
the basic scheme generally shows poor performance compared
to all other key management schemes in terms of network
resilience as it has a larger key ring size per node. Thus, a
compromised node will leak out the key information which
can be used to attack other parts of networks even if they
are geographically far apart. This motivates us to think of a
technique to update the key of the whole network so that the
remaining part of the network can still be protected even if
some of the keys leak out. Thirdly, the use of deployment
knowledge scheme shows a firewall effect which limits the
attack to the attack region, especially, under the closest neigh-
bor attack pattern. However, we argue that the influence of this
firewall effect, in fact, is a double edge sword. On one hand,
it prevents the effect of node capture from propagating to the
whole network. On the other hand, the nodes in the attack
region are totally sacrificed. This motivates us to design a
technique to replace the functions of the compromised nodes
in the attack region so as to restore the normal operation of
the network.
B. Assumptions
1. Sensor nodes are randomly distributed in a large area in
which secure links are formed between those neighbors with
a common key.
2. After a node is captured, the sensitive information inside
is leaked out and can be used to attack other parts of the
network even if other nodes are geographically far apart.
3. In this paper, since we focus on the effect of applying
the recovery strategies to the whole network and the attack
region, we assume that the attack model and attack region can
be figured out by using some other means [17].
C. Link Replacement Strategy
The main idea of link replacement strategy is to do key
update on three neighbor nodes in which secure links are
mutually formed between them, so that some of the compro-
mised links can be recovered. In the following subsection, we
describe the link replacement procedures in detail.
1) Link Replacement Procedures: Suppose there are three
nodes A, B, and C as shown in Figure 2. The links AB, BC,
and AC are secured by keys Kc, Ka, and Kb, respectively. To
perform link replacement, each link is chosen in turn. Suppose
the link BC is chosen in the figure and we need to replace
key Ka with another key Ka′′ .
Afterwards, the sensor node at the other end of the chosen
link is responsible to generate a secret and send the generated
secret to the adjacent nodes of the chosen link securely through
the links. As can be seen from step 2 of Figure 2, node A is
responsible to generate a secret Ka′ and send Ka′ to node B
and node C through the links AB and AC which are secured
by keys Kc and Kb, respectively.
Then, the two nodes adjacent to the chosen link generate the
new key of the chosen link independently. The new key can
be generated by hashing the original key with that of the new
secret received. Now, node B, and C generate the same new
key Ka′′ = hash(Ka,Ka′), respectively. Thereafter, Ka′′ is
used to secure the link BC. Finally, the remaining two keys
Kb and Kc used to secure the links AC and AB, respectively,
can be replaced by following the same procedures described
above.
2) Security Analysis: In this section, we present our se-
curity analysis on the replacement procedure by considering
three cases.
Case 1: None of the links is compromised. Because all three
links are still secured, there is no change in the number of the
compromised links in the network.
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AB CKa
KbKc
A
B CKa
Kc(Ka') Kb(Ka')
A
B CKa''
Kc Kb
1. To rollover link
secured by Key Ka
2. Node A generates Ka'
and send it securely to B
and C using Kc and Kb,
respectively
3. Node B and C generate
Ka'' independently by:
Ka'' = hash(Ka, Ka')
Fig. 2. Link replacement procedure.
Case 2: Either one of the three links is compromised. In this
case, the only compromised link is recovered to a normal link.
This situation involves two parts. In the first part, the chosen
link is a normal link and the newly generated secret must
pass through the compromised link. Since the transmission of
a secret through a compromised link is supposed to be leaked
out, the attacker knows the newly generated secret used to do
key update. However, since the original key is still secured,
hashing the original key with a leaked secret will still lead
to a secure new key. In the second part, the chosen link is a
compromised link and the secret passes through two normal
links. Because the secret passes through two normal links, the
attacker does not know the newly generated secret. As a result,
hashing a secure secret and a compromised key will result in a
secure new key. By doing so, the compromised link is replaced
by a normal link.
Case 3: Two or more links are compromised. Since two
or more links are compromised, the secret generated must
pass through the compromised link. As a result, the newly
generated key will remain in the same status as that of the
original key.
3) Mathematical Analysis: Cases 1, 2, and 3 consist of one,
three, and four combinations, respectively. From the security
analysis in Section IV-C.2, cases 1 and 3 have no effect on
the total number of the compromised links in the network,
while the case 2 can actually reduce the total number of
compromised links. As a result, we are particularly interested
in the probability of the existence of the case 2 if there exist
three neighbors forming mutually secure links. We denote the
case in which three neighbors forming mutually secure links
as a triangle structure in our paper. In a dense sensor network
with an appropriate secure connectivity, there exists a large
number of triangle structures.
In the attack region, suppose the total number of the com-
promised links is C, the total number of links is T . With these
two parameters, we can assume that a link has a probability
of CT to be compromised in that region. With the existence
of a triangle structure, the probability of the existence of
case 2 discussed in Section IV-C.2 can be approximated by
Equation (1).
P (Case2) = 3× (C
T
)× (1− C
T
)2 (1)
D. Node Replenishment Strategy
The main idea of the node replenishment strategy is to
replace the functions of the compromised nodes as well as
the dead nodes in a WSN by deploying some new nodes into
the network. In implementing the node replenishment strategy,
there are several issues to be considered.
Where should the new nodes be deployed?
With the assumption that the attack pattern and the attack
region can be detected, it is possible to limit the target region
for node replenishment to a rectangle as shown in Figure 3.
The rectangular area can be easily derived with the knowledge
of estimated compromised nodes’ locations. The new nodes
can then be randomly distributed over the region.
How can the newly deployed nodes interact with the
existing nodes in the network?
Basically, the key pool of the newly deployed nodes contains
both new generated keys and the old keys. To connect the
existing nodes in the network, only the old keys can be used. It
is possible for a newly deployed node to connect to the normal
existing nodes as shown in Figure 3 or the compromised nodes
which are not shown in the figure. It is worthwhile to state
that if the newly deployed node connects to another newly
deployed node or a normal existing node, a normal link is
formed. However, if it connects to a compromised node, a
compromise link is formed.
In the first case, if a newly deployed node connects to a
normal node, it is possible for the newly established link to
be secure or compromised. The probability of the existence
of a secure (or a compromised link) depends on the ratio of
the compromised links in the region. As a result, it will not
affect the ratio of compromised links in the region. However,
as discussed in Section IV-C, link replacement strategy will
be performed together with the link addition process. Conse-
quently, the addition of the new link can help reduce the ratio
of compromised links in the region. In the second case, the
newly established links are supposed to be compromised if a
new node connects to a compromised node. This will increase
the ratio of the compromised links in the region. With the
assumption that the amount of compromised nodes are small,
the increase in the number of compromised links due to this
reason is expected to be acceptable.
How can the newly deployed nodes interact among
themselves?
A newly deployed node can only use newly generated keys
in the key pool to connect other newly deployed nodes in
the region as the newly generated keys do not present in the
existing nodes, so it is impossible to compromise these new
keys before new nodes are deployed. In other words, all the
new links formed are guaranteed to be secured.
What should be the appropriate ratio between the new
keys and the old keys?
The ratio between new keys and old keys determines the
number of different types of new links. The higher this ratio,
the larger the number of new links formed between new nodes.
These links are resilient to the previously captured nodes.
However, the higher this ratio, the smaller amount of links
formed between the new nodes and old nodes. This violates
our objective to extend the lifetime of the existing network. We
believe that finding an optimal ratio is an important research
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problem, which is outside the scope of our present paper. In
the following, we assume that this ratio is 1 : 1.
Before Node Replenishment, compromised
nodes, compromised links and dead nodes
exist in the region and the region is nearly
disconnected
After Node Replenishment, new nodes
formed new links (including both using
new keys and old keys) and some
compromised links are recovered by the
link replacement srtategy
Compromised Link
Compromised Node
Dead Node
New Node
New Link with New Key
New Link with Old Key
Link Recoved by Link
Replacement Strategy
Fig. 3. Node replenishment strategy.
1) Mathematical Analysis: Table I lists the notation used
in this section.
TABLE I
NOTATION.
Symbol Description
Nr Number of nodes in the region
Nc Number of compromised nodes in the region
Nn Number of new nodes in the region
Cr Number of compromised links in the region
Cn Number of compromised links after link addition
Cn′ Number of compromised links after link addition and link replacement
Tr Number of links in the region
Tn Number of links after link addition
Tn′ Number of links after link addition and link replacement
po Secure connectivity ratio using old keys
pn Secure connectivity ratio using new keys
d Expected number of neighbors (Degree) after the node replenishment
Equation (2) illustrates the compromised links ratio in
the region after the link addition process is completed. The
main idea is to recalculate the total number of compromised
links and total number of links after node replenishment,
respectively. These two kinds of links can be estimated by
summing the old existing links and the new links formed. In
recalculating the total number of links (i.e., the denominator
of Equation (2)). The term po×d×Nn× NrNr+Nn represents the
newly established links to the old nodes which is affected by
the density of old nodes, the number of new nodes deployed
and also the secure connectivity that can be brought by using
the old keys. The term po × d×Nn × NnNr+Nn represents the
newly established links within the new nodes themselves.
On the other hand, in recalculating the total number of
compromised links (i.e., the nominator of Equation (2)) (po×
d×Nn)( NcNr+Nn ) represents the situation in which a new node
connects to a compromised node. If a new node connects
to a normal node, there is a probability CrTr that the new
link formed has already been compromised. The number of
compromised links formed due to this case is represented by
(po × d×Nn)(Nr−NcNr+Nn × CrTr ).
Cn
Tn
=
Cr + (po × d×Nn)( NcNr+Nn +
Nr−Nc
Nr+Nn
× Cr
Tr
)
Tr + ((po × NrNr+Nn ) + (pn ×
Nn
Nr+Nn
))× d×Nn
(2)
After new links are formed with both new nodes and exist-
ing nodes (no matter compromised or not), new compromised
links ratio CnTn is formed based on Equation (2). At this stage,
the link replacement strategy discussed in Section IV-D will
then be performed. By applying Equation (1) and Equation (2),
the compromised links ratio in the region after the whole node
replenishment process can be estimated by Equation (3).
Cn′
Tn′
= (1− P (Case2))× Cn
Tn
(3)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulation, 10000 nodes are generated in a region of
1000 units ×1000 units. The transmission range is 40 units.
The key pool size is 100000. The key ring sizes are 200
for basic scheme and 46 for deployment knowledge scheme,
respectively. These two key ring size settings correspond to
the secure connectivity of 0.33 in [14], [15]. For these newly
deployed nodes, 50% of the keys are new keys.
A. Network-Wide Performance
To study the effect of node replenishment, we measure
the network resilience of a key management scheme before
and after adding new nodes. In our simulations, 77, 195, 296
nodes are newly added in the compromised region upon
50, 100, 150 nodes are compromised, respectively. We can
see that when more nodes are compromised, we need to
deploy more new nodes as the compromised region is larger
in both schemes. Figure 4(a) illustrates the change of network
resilience at different attack intervals for the basic scheme,
while Figure 4(b) shows the change of network resilience as a
measure of node replenishment for the deployment knowledge
scheme. There is a drop in the fraction of compromised links
when new nodes are replenished in the compromised region
in both figures.
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Fig. 4. Performance of node replenishment applied to both schemes.
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE NODE REPLENISHMENT SCHEME IN THE WHOLE
NETWORK.
Basic Scheme
Replenishment interval No. of nodes added Improvement
50 77 0%
100 195 4.72%
150 296 7.93%
Deployment Knowledge Scheme
Replenishment interval No. of nodes added Improvement
50 64 0%
100 168 2.87%
150 243 5.45%
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF THE NODE REPLENISHMENT SCHEME IN THE TARGET
REGION.
Basic Scheme
Description Original Simulation Analytical
Compromised Links 154 144 203
Total Links 911 9393 9338
Compromised Ratio 0.169 0.0153 0.0217
Improvement N/A 10.0 7.79
Deployment Knowledge Scheme
Description Original Simulation Analytical
Compromised Links 462 565 607
Total Links 931 3265 4087
Compromised Ratio 0.496 0.1730 0.1485
Improvement N/A 1.87 2.34
On the other hand, Table II illustrates the improvements
achieved by our proposed node replenishment strategy for both
schemes. Both schemes show a certain percentage of improve-
ment with the use of our strategy. However, the improvement
of deployment knowledge scheme is less significant than that
of the basic scheme. This is because the nodes in the vicinity
of the compromised area may contain keys from the similar
portion in the key pool. Consequently, the link replacement
continues to use those compromised keys.
B. Target Region Performance
In this section, we investigate the network resilience in the
region where new nodes are deployed. In our simulations, we
specifically consider the time durations before and after new
nodes are deployed when 100 nodes are compromised and
neglect the links connected to the compromised nodes. For
the basic scheme, we use the following settings obtained from
simulation after 100 nodes are compromised for analytical
calculations: po is 0.0952, pn is 0.995, d is 83, Nr and Nn
are 195. For the deployment knowledge scheme, the following
settings are used: po is 0.418, pn is 0.273, d is 85, Nr and
Nn are 168.
Table III illustrates the simulation and mathematical analysis
results on both basic scheme and deployment knowledge
scheme. Both sets of results indicate that the node replen-
ishment schemes can achieve significant improvement in the
region in which the improvement in basic scheme is larger
than that of deployment knowledge scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We considered two node capture attack patterns and sum-
marized their corresponding characteristics. We then proposed
two novel recovery strategies—Link Replacement Strategy and
Node Replenishment Strategy. We demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of our proposed strategies through both mathemati-
cally analysis and simulation. Our proposed strategies achieve
significant improvement in terms of network resilience. We
assumed that it is possible to detect the compromised region
based on the characteristics of the node capture attack pattern.
However, how this can be done in practice remains as one of
the most challenging future work. Furthermore, the problem of
finding an optimal old key to new key ratio based on different
application scenarios is another interesting research problem.
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